The High Court Report

Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Argued: 3/25/26 | Decided: May 28, 2026 | Docket Link: Here
Overview: The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that last-mile delivery workers who never cross state lines still qualify for the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption from mandatory arbitration if their intrastate routes form part of a continuous interstate journey.
Question Presented: Whether a worker qualifies for the FAA's Section 1 arbitration exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with interstate vehicles.
Posture: District court denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert.
Main Arguments:
Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 requires workers to cross state lines or interact with interstate vehicles; (2) Brock's purely intrastate route falls outside Congress's intended scope of the exemption; (3) Extending Section 1 to intrastate-only workers produces an unworkable, open-ended standard.
Brock (Respondent): (1) Statutory text "engaged in interstate commerce" covers workers on intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys; (2) Historical Commerce Clause precedent confirms intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce; (3) The Court's own precedent in Saxon already rejected a crossing-state-lines requirement.

Holding: The Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption from compelled arbitration for workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. §1, can apply to a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey and who does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No concurrences. No dissents. Tenth Circuit judgment affirmed.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning: (1) The 1925-era plain meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce" encompasses intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys — nothing in the text requires crossing state lines or tagging interstate vehicles; (2) The Daniel Ball (1871) and a line of Commerce Clause cases confirm that purely intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce when moving goods within a continuous multi-state shipment; (3) Flowers Foods waived alternative arguments — including independent-contractor status and title transfer — by staking its entire case on the rejected cross-or-tag rule.
Separate Opinions: None.
Implications:
Last-mile delivery drivers, food distributors, and local couriers whose routes remain within a single state now hold stronger claims to Section 1 protection — blocking companies from compelling arbitration and reopening access to class action litigation.
Companies relying on arbitration clauses in franchisee and distributor agreements face exposure on wage claims.
Two questions remain open: whether Section 1 covers workers operating through independently owned business entities, and whether taking title to goods defeats the exemption — issues currently splitting the circuits.

The Fine Print:
Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) defining "interstate commerce": "[t]raffic, intercourse, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state"

Primary Cases:
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): An airline cargo loader who never flew or crossed state lines still qualified as a transportation worker "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.
The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871): A steamer operating entirely within Michigan still "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for or arriving from other states — multiple intrastate actors can collectively form one interstate transaction.

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones Day
For Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here
Overview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.
Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.
Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Main Arguments:
Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.
Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.

Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.
Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;
(2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;
(3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.

Implications:
Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.
Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.

The Fine Print:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:
Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.

Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips Black
Respondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor General
United States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:07] Oral Advocates
[00:01:21] Argument Begins
[00:01:29] Pitchford Opening Statement
[00:03:49] Pitchford Free for All Questions
[00:28:09] Pitchford Round Robin Questions
[00:54:35] Cain Opening Statement
[00:56:46] Cain Free for All Questions
[01:15:43] Cain Round Robin Questions
[01:34:48] United States Opening Statement
[01:35:51] United States Free for All Questions
[01:45:22] United States Round Robin Questions
[01:48:42] Pitchford Rebuttal

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here
Overview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.
Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.
Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Main Arguments:
Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.
Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.

Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.
Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;
(2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;
(3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.

Implications:
Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.
Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.

The Fine Print:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:
Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.

Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips Black
Respondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor General
United States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here
Overview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.
Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.
Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.
For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Main Arguments:
Fernandez (Petitioner):
(1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;
(2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;
(3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.
United States (Respondent):
(1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;
(2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;
(3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.

Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;
(2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;
(3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.
Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.

Implications:
Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments.
Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn.
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework.
The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.

The Fine Print:
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."

Primary Cases:
Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.
Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Overview
[00:00:48] Argument Begins
[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement
[00:03:10] Petitioner Free for All Questions
[00:28:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions
[00:40:01] Respondent Opening Statement
[00:42:17] Respondent Free for All Questions
[01:10:17] Respondent Round Robin Questions
[01:19:07] Petitioner Rebuttal

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: Here
Overview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.
Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.
Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.
Main Arguments:
Fernandez (Petitioner):
(1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;
(2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;
(3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.
United States (Respondent):
(1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;
(2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;
(3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.

Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;
(2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;
(3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.
Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.

Implications:
Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments.
Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn.
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework.
The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.

The Fine Print:
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."

Primary Cases:
Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.
Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.
For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.