The High Court Report

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here
Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLP
Respondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP

Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which blocks federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments — can apply when the state-court decision remains subject to further appeal in state court.
Overview: A Maryland woman who signed a consent order to secure her release from involuntary psychiatric commitment challenges a federal doctrine that slammed the federal courthouse door before her state-court appeal concluded — dividing the federal circuits.
Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rooker-Feldman; expressly split from majority of circuits.
Main Arguments:
• T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending to non-final judgments; (3) Preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without a jurisdictional bar
• UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-part test contains no finality requirement; (2) District courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments regardless of pending review; (3) T.M.'s rule would produce gamesmanship, parallel duplicative litigation, and profound federalism harm
Implications: A T.M. victory gives any state-court loser who raises a constitutional claim an open path to federal district court while state appeals remain pending — broadening federal access but triggering parallel proceedings across two court systems. A UMD victory preserves the rule that state-court losers must exhaust state remedies before federal district courts intervene, reinforcing comity but potentially denying urgent federal relief before the state appellate process concludes. Either outcome reshapes how hundreds of thousands of civil litigants navigate federal courthouse access every year.
The Fine Print:
• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."
• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Primary Cases:
• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claim supports their position.
• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack power to reverse or modify state-court judgments — one of only two cases where the Supreme Court ever applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss a federal suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the doctrine's namesake.
Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:15] Oral Advocates
[00:01:27] Argument Begins
[00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement
[00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions
[00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions
[00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement
[00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions
[00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions
[00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here
Oral Advocates:
Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLP
Respondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.
Overview: Federal securities enforcement showdown asks whether the SEC must prove actual investor money losses before courts order fraudsters to surrender profits — reshaping a $6.1 billion annual enforcement tool.
Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Second Circuit requires it; Supreme Court granted cert January 9, 2026.
Main Arguments:
Sripetch (Petitioner): (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's definition of disgorgement, which requires restoring funds to actual victims; (3) Allowing victimless disgorgement creates incoherent statutory anomalies and lets the SEC circumvent procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.
SEC (Respondent): (1) Disgorgement strips wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains rather than compensating victims — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 disgorgement provisions, signaling no pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) The statutory phrase "unjust enrichment" carries a common-law meaning that never required monetary loss.

Implications: Sripetch victory forces the SEC to document specific investor money losses before courts order disgorgement — shrinking the SEC's multibillion-dollar enforcement arsenal and potentially shielding cleverly structured fraud schemes from profit-stripping orders. SEC victory preserves the agency's ability to disgorge profits from any securities violation regardless of whether identifiable investors lost money, keeping market manipulation unprofitable even when individual victims remain unharmed on paper. Lower courts, practitioners, and compliance officers across the securities industry await the Court's answer.
The Fine Print:
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."

Primary Cases:
Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held that SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must "be awarded for victims" — the foundational ruling both sides now dispute.
SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit held that disgorgement requires proof of investor pecuniary harm, creating the circuit split that prompted the Supreme Court's cert grant.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:07] Oral Advocates
[00:01:17] Argument Begins
[00:01:26] Sripetch Opening Statement
[00:03:33] Sripetch Free for All Questions
[00:25:18] Sripetch Round Robin Questions
[00:41:42] SEC Opening Statement
[00:44:17] SEC Free for All Questions
[01:08:35] SEC Round Robin Questions
[01:08:48] Sripetch Rebuttal

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves patented uses from its label actively induces patent infringement through investor press releases and website statements that do not mention, encourage, or instruct the patented use
Overview: Generic drugmaker Hikma followed federal skinny-label law but called its product "generic Vascepa" and touted Vascepa's total sales. Brand manufacturer Amarin claims those statements actively induced doctors to prescribe the generic for a patented cardiovascular use worth over $900 million annually.
Posture: District court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 2026.
Main Arguments:
• Hikma (Petitioner): (1) "Actively" induces requires affirmative steps encouraging infringement — none of Hikma's statements mention or instruct the patented use; (2) Amarin's theory of liability imputes inferences physicians might draw, not active steps Hikma took; (3) The Federal Circuit's decision effectively nullifies the section viii skinny-label pathway Congress created to speed generic competition
• Amarin (Respondent): (1) Hikma advertised its generic for "Hypertriglyceridemia" — a category encompassing the patented cardiovascular use — going beyond compliant labeling; (2) Press releases calling the product "generic Vascepa" and touting $919 million to $1.1 billion in total Vascepa sales plausibly encouraged prescribers to use the generic for all of Vascepa's indications; (3) Seven other generic manufacturers selling identical skinny-label products avoided suit by accurately limiting their marketing — proving that compliant speech and section viii coexist
Implications: Hikma victory establishes that skinny-label compliance shields generic manufacturers from inducement liability for accurate commercial descriptions, protecting the section viii pathway that delivers billions in consumer drug savings annually. Amarin victory confirms that post-label marketing conduct — even investor communications — can cross the line into active patent infringement inducement, preserving incentives for brand manufacturers to invest hundreds of millions in discovering new therapeutic uses. The Court's answer defines the legal boundary between ordinary commerce and unlawful inducement for the entire pharmaceutical industry.
The Fine Print:
• 35 U.S.C. § 271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer"
• 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii): Permits a generic manufacturer to file a statement seeking approval only for uses not covered by the brand manufacturer's listed method-of-use patents, allowing the generic to carry a "skinny label" that carves out still-patented uses
Primary Cases:
• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Inducement liability requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement" — mere knowledge that a product may reach infringing uses does not suffice; liability demands "statements or actions directed to promoting infringement"
• Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S (2012): Congress designed the section viii skinny-label mechanism to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones," expediting generic competition as soon as patents allow

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.
Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.
Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.
Main Arguments:
Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.
Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."

Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.
The Fine Print:
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."

Primary Cases:
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.
Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.
Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.
Main Arguments:
• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.
• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.
Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.
The Fine Print:
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."

Primary Cases:
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.