The High Court Report

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.
Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.
Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.
Result: Affirmed.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.
The Fine Print:
8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:
INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes
Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.
Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.
Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court
Majority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.
Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)
Link to Opinion: Here.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:
• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"
• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"
Primary Cases:
• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive
• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.
Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.
Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.
Result: Affirmed.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.
The Fine Print:
8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:
INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes
Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.
Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.
Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court
Majority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.
Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)
Link to Opinion: Here.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:
• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"
• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"
Primary Cases:
• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive
• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

Dr. Adam Feldman called it before the Court released it. His 25-year dataset — 1,700+ cases — flagged the timing before anyone else caught on. The High Court Report sits down with Dr. Feldman to break down exactly what the numbers revealed.
In this episode:
Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.
How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.
Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.
Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.
About Dr. Adam Feldman:
Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.
Reach Adam Feldman via:
LinkedIn: Here;
Empirical SCOTUS: Here;
Legalytics: Here;
Empirilaw: Here.

Adam Feldman's Work:
The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-search
The $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search