The High Court Report

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Argument: 11/3/25 | Decided: 3/25/26
Link to Docket: Here.
Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.
Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.
Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.
Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.
Result: Reversed and remanded.
Link to Opinion: Here.
Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.
Implications:
Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations.
Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences.
Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases.
Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."

Primary Cases:
Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.
United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Overview
[00:00:37] Argument Begins
[00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement
[00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions
[00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions
[00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement
[00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions
[00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions
[00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Argument: 11/3/25 | Decided: 3/25/26
Link to Docket: Here.
Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.
Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.
Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.
Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.
Result: Reversed and remanded.
Link to Opinion: Here.
Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.
Implications:
Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations.
Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences.
Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases.
Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."

Primary Cases:
Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.
United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Case Overview and Holding
[00:00:52] Subscribe and Contact
[00:01:14] Rico's Background and Supervised Release
[00:02:07] Absconding and New Crimes
[00:03:33] Lower Courts and Circuit Split
[00:04:33] Supreme Court Question
[00:05:07] Majority Textual Reasoning
[00:07:03] Government Arguments Rejected
[00:08:22] Decision and Remand
[00:08:38] Alito's Dissent Explained
[00:11:15] Practical Impact Nationwide
[00:13:01] Wrap Up and Outro

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Date Decided: 3/25/26
Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.
Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.
Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.
Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.
Result: Reversed and remanded.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.
Link to Opinion: Here.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.
The Fine Print:
17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."

Primary Cases:
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Timestamps:
[00:00] Oral Argument Introduction
[01:28] Oral Argument Begins
[01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement
[03:37] Petitioner Free for All Questions
[19:25] Petitioner Round Robin Questions
[41:21] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement
[42:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions
[51:39] Amicus Curaie Round Robin Questions
[01:01:23] Respondent Opening Statement
[01:03:44] Respondent Free for All Questions
[01:31:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions
[01:39:19] Petitioner Rebuttal

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Date Decided: 3/25/26
Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.
Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.
Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.
Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.

Result: Reversed and remanded.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.
Link to Opinion: Here.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.
The Fine Print:
17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."

Primary Cases:
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/25/26
Question Presented: Whether last-mile delivery drivers who never cross state lines qualify as transportation workers "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.
Overview: Flowers Foods required its Colorado bread delivery driver, Angelo Brock, to arbitrate wage disputes. Brock never crossed a state line. The Court must decide whether the 1925 FAA's transportation worker exemption covers last-mile drivers.
Posture: D. Colo. denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; four-circuit split prompted cert grant.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones Day
For Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Main Arguments:
Flowers Foods (Petitioner):
(1) Section 1 covers only workers who directly and actively move goods across state or international borders;
(2) historical 1925 labor schemes excluded purely local intrastate workers;
(3) the Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test turns simple arbitration threshold questions into costly mini-trials

Angelo Brock (Respondent):
(1) century of Supreme Court precedent defined last-mile workers finishing an interstate goods journey as "engaged in interstate commerce";
(2) seamen and railroad employees in 1925 included last-mile workers who never crossed a border;
(3) Flowers argued its last-mile drivers qualify as interstate workers under the Motor Carrier Act — and won — directly contradicting its position here

Implications: A Flowers win strips court access from last-mile drivers at FedEx, UPS, Amazon Logistics, and the U.S. Postal Service — forcing employment disputes into private arbitration and shielding company labor practices from judicial review. A Brock win preserves court access for workers serving more than 170 million delivery addresses and anchors a century of interstate commerce precedent in the modern gig economy.
The Fine Print:
9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"

Primary Cases:
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): Transportation workers must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders to qualify for the FAA Section 1 exemption
Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024): Transportation workers need not work for a transportation industry company to qualify for Section 1, but must actively engage in transporting goods across borders

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:02] Argument Begins
[00:01:08] Flowers Food Opening Statement
[00:03:21] Flowers Food Free for All Questions
[00:27:30] Flowers Food Round Robin Questions
[00:32:08] Brock Opening Statement
[00:34:35] Brock Free for All Questions
[01:05:32] Brock Round Robin Questions
[01:14:23] Flowers Food Rebuttal