The High Court Report

Noem v. Al Otro Lado | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/24/26
Question Presented: Whether noncitizens stopped on Mexican soil "arrive in the United States" triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing requirements.
Overview: Border control challenge determines whether immigration officers can block asylum seekers at ports of entry before statutory protections attach, or whether federal law requires processing anyone who presents themselves at the border.
Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; fifteen judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.
Oral Advocates:
Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
Respondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection

Main Arguments:
Government (Petitioner): (1) Plain meaning of "arrives in" requires physical territorial entry—Greeks outside Troy's walls did not "arrive in" Troy; (2) Section 1225's inspection, detention, and removal procedures require U.S. presence—officers cannot inspect people standing in Mexico; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality and Sale precedent confirm statutes apply only within U.S. territory.
Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in the United States" encompasses presentation at ports of entry to avoid rendering phrase redundant with "physically present"; (2) Congress enacted provisions to implement non-refoulement treaty obligations prohibiting return of refugees to persecution; (3) Government regulations for decades defined "arriving alien" as someone "attempting to come" into the United States at ports of entry.

Implications: Government victory preserves Executive Branch authority to manage border surges through metering, allowing officers to control entry timing at ports during capacity constraints. Asylum seeker victory requires immediate inspection and processing for anyone reaching ports of entry regardless of resources, potentially forcing facility entry to comply with statutory mandates.
The Fine Print:
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States...may apply for asylum"
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (a)(3): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States...shall be deemed...an applicant for admission" who "shall be inspected by immigration officers"

Primary Cases:
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Presumption against extraterritoriality bars applying immigration statutes to refugees interdicted at sea before reaching U.S. territory; statutes apply only within United States.
DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020): Arriving aliens physically on U.S. soil remain treated as stopped at the boundary line without having effected entry; arrival and admission constitute distinct legal statuses.

Timestamps
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:23] Argument Begins
[00:01:29] United States Opening Statement
[00:02:40] United States Free for All Questions
[00:27:04] United States Round Robin Questions
[00:40:34] Al Otro Lado Opening Statement
[00:42:52] Al Otro Lado Free for All Questions
[01:10:56] Al Otro Lado Round Robin Questions
[01:18:32] United States Rebuttal

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/24/26
Overview: Fifth Circuit's mechanical judicial estoppel rule bars claims entirely when bankruptcy filers fail to timely disclose lawsuits, creating circuit split over whether courts must consider all circumstances or presume bad faith from potential motive alone.
Question Presented: Whether courts can bar a person's lawsuit if that person filed for bankruptcy and forgot to tell the bankruptcy court about the lawsuit?
Posture: Under rigid estoppel rule, district court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's lawsuit.
Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (Keathley): Gregory G. Garre of Latham and Watkins
United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur): Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
Respondent (Buddy Ayers Construction): William M. Jay of Goodwin Proctor

Main Arguments:
Petitioner Keathley:
(1) Courts must examine all circumstances, not presume bad intent automatically
(2) Estoppel punishes deliberate manipulation, not honest mistakes or simple confusion
(3) Rule rewards wrongdoers, harms innocent debtors, contradicts bankruptcy's fresh-start promise

Respondent Ayers Construction:
(1) Estoppel requires objective inconsistency, not proof of subjective bad intent
(2) Mistake exception covers only objective errors, not every non-malicious explanation
(3) Seventeen-factor test creates unworkable trials, eliminates deterrence, guts disclosure requirements

United States (supporting Keathley):
(1) Equity requires holistic assessment including bankruptcy-specific factors, not mechanical presumptions
(2) Bankruptcy courts' firsthand findings deserve weight when assessing debtor intent
(3) Fifth Circuit's restricted inquiry ignores relevant evidence, contradicts equitable principles

Implications:
Keathley victory: courts examine full circumstances before blocking lawsuits. Ayers victory: automatic blocking regardless of honest mistakes or creditor harm.
The Fine Print:
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i): "The debtor shall file a schedule of assets and liabilities"
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a): "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed"

Primary Cases:
New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Estoppel targets deliberate manipulation, not inadvertence or honest mistakes
Holland v. Florida (2010): Equity demands flexible judgments, not rigid mechanical rules

Timestamps
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:18] Argument Begins
[00:01:26] Keathley Opening Statement
[00:03:33] Keathley Free for All Questions
[00:18:46] Keathley Round Robin Questions
[00:33:09] United States Opening Statement
[00:34:28] United States Free for All Questions
[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions
[00:47:24] Buddy Ayers Opening Statement
[00:49:27] Buddy Ayers Free for All Questions
[01:09:04] Buddy Ayers Round Robin Questions
[01:09:13] Keathley Rebuttal

Watson v. Republican National Committee (RNC) | Case No. 24-1260 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/23/26
Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.
Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.
Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.
Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (Mississippi): Scott Stewart, Mississippi’s Solicitor General
Respondent (RNC): Paul D. Clement of Clement and Murphy
United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor General

Main Arguments:
Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.
Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.

Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.
The Fine Print:
2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"
Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final tallies

Primary Cases:
Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.
Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:02] Argument Begins
[00:01:13] Watson Opening Statement
[00:03:10] Watson Free for All Questions
[00:27:07] Watson Round Robin Questions
[00:56:51] RNC Opening Statement
[00:59:02] RNC Free for All Questions
[01:17:29] RNC Round Robin Questions
[01:51:58] United States Opening Statement
[01:52:57] United States Free for All Questions
[02:02:11] United States Round Robin Questions
[02:05:17] Watson Rebuttal

Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermon Suit over Section 1983 | Argument Date: 12/3/25 | Date Decided: 3/20/26
In Olivier versus City of Brandon, Mississippi, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a person previously convicted under a law can still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement. Justice Kagan wrote for the full Court. No concurrences. No dissents.
Link to Docket: Here.
Question Presented:
Can someone who already received a criminal conviction under a law still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement — or does a 1994 Supreme Court precedent called Heck versus Humphrey permanently close that door?
Does Heck versus Humphrey block a federal civil rights lawsuit even when the person suing never had the ability to challenge their conviction through the normal imprisonment-challenge process — called habeas corpus — in the first place?

Holding: 9-0. A person who previously received a criminal conviction under a law can still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement.
Rationale:
Olivier sought future relief — not to undo his conviction.
Heck targets backward-looking attacks on convictions, not forward-looking injunctions.
Wooley versus Maynard already resolved this question in 1977.

Result: Reversed.
Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No concurrences. No dissents.
Link to Opinion: Here.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Olivier): Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, TX.
For United States (as Amicus Curiae) in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
For Respondents (City of Brandon): G. Todd Butler, Flowood, MS argued for Respondents.

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 4/1/26
Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?
Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.
Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Main Arguments:
Government:
(1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law;
(2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship;
(3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.

Families:
(1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule;
(2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction;
(3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.

Implications:
Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations.
Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.

The Fine Print:
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Primary Cases:
United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship.
Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.