The High Court Report

Watson v. Republican National Committee | Case No. 24-1260 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/23/26
Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.
Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.
Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.
Main Arguments:
Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.
Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.

Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.
The Fine Print:
2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"
Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final tallies

Primary Cases:
Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.
Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport reaches far beyond one truck accident. The Supreme Court must answer a fundamental question: Does federal law shield freight brokers from state tort claims when they select a motor carrier that causes a catastrophic crash?
Marc S. Blubaugh joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Marc serves as Partner at Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP and Counsel of Record for the Transportation Intermediaries Association — the trade group representing over 1,700 freight brokerage companies. He wrote the amicus brief Justice Kavanaugh cited by name and page number during oral argument.
Marc explains the legal framework, then pulls back to reveal the full picture. The $343 billion freight brokerage industry operates on the premise that federal law — not state juries — determines which motor carriers may operate on America's roads. But plaintiffs' lawyers now name brokers in virtually every major truck accident case, threatening to reshape who enters the market and how efficiently America's supply chain runs.
The stakes cut both directions. Injured parties deserve recourse when dangerous carriers cause catastrophic accidents. Marc walks through why petitioner's counsel argues an 80,000-pound truck sits at the center of every negligent hiring claim — and why the safety exception exists precisely to preserve that theory.
A broker victory brings certainty and supply chain efficiency. A petitioner victory turns brokers into federal safety inspectors without the tools to do the job. The Court's reasoning will define preemption fights in the transportation industry for years.
Listen to the full March 4, 2026 oral argument: Here.
Listen to The High Court Report case preview: Here.
Connect with Marc Blubaugh on LinkedIn: Here.
Connect with Marc Blubaugh at Benesch Law: Here.
Fine Print
• §14501(c)(1): Preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service" of interstate brokers
• §14501(c)(2)(A): Preserves state authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles"
• §14501(b)(1): Preempts state laws "relating to intrastate rates, routes, or services" of brokers
Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Episode Preview
[00:00:40] Guest Introduction
[00:01:57] 60 Second Takeaway from Oral Arguments
[00:09:04] Logistics Ecosystem
[00:10:35] What Brokers Do
[00:10:53] Broker Licensing Basics
[00:11:04] Motor Carriers Explained
[00:11:27] Drivers and Authority
[00:11:54] Consignee at Delivery
[00:14:29] Legal Battle Over Liability
[00:18:43] How the Arguments Unfolded at Oral Arguments
[00:30:08] What Happens if Montgomery Wins? If the Brokers Win?
[00:33:26] Wrap Up

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport reaches far beyond one truck accident. The Supreme Court must answer a fundamental question: Does federal law shield freight brokers from state tort claims when they select a motor carrier that causes a catastrophic crash?
Marc S. Blubaugh joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Marc serves as Partner at Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP and Counsel of Record for the Transportation Intermediaries Association — the trade group representing over 1,700 freight brokerage companies. He wrote the amicus brief Justice Kavanaugh cited by name and page number during oral argument.
Marc explains the legal framework, then pulls back to reveal the full picture. The $343 billion freight brokerage industry operates on the premise that federal law — not state juries — determines which motor carriers may operate on America's roads. But plaintiffs' lawyers now name brokers in virtually every major truck accident case, threatening to reshape who enters the market and how efficiently America's supply chain runs.
The stakes cut both directions. Injured parties deserve recourse when dangerous carriers cause catastrophic accidents. Marc walks through why petitioner's counsel argues an 80,000-pound truck sits at the center of every negligent hiring claim — and why the safety exception exists precisely to preserve that theory.
A broker victory brings certainty and supply chain efficiency. A petitioner victory turns brokers into federal safety inspectors without the tools to do the job. The Court's reasoning will define preemption fights in the transportation industry for years.
Listen to the full March 4, 2026 oral argument: Here.
Listen to The High Court Report case preview: Here.
Connect with Marc Blubaugh on LinkedIn: Here.
Connect with Marc Blubaugh at Benesch Law: Here.
Fine Print
• §14501(c)(1): Preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service" of interstate brokers
• §14501(c)(2)(A): Preserves state authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles"
• §14501(b)(1): Preempts state laws "relating to intrastate rates, routes, or services" of brokers
Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Episode Preview
[00:00:40] Guest Introduction
[00:01:57] 60 Second Takeaway from Oral Arguments
[00:09:04] Logistics Ecosystem
[00:10:35] What Brokers Do
[00:10:53] Broker Licensing Basics
[00:11:04] Motor Carriers Explained
[00:11:27] Drivers and Authority
[00:11:54] Consignee at Delivery
[00:14:29] Legal Battle Over Liability
[00:18:43] How the Arguments Unfolded at Oral Arguments
[00:30:08] What Happens if Montgomery Wins? If the Brokers Win?
[00:33:26] Wrap Up

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.
Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.
Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.
Result: Affirmed.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.
The Fine Print:
8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:
INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here
Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes
Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.
Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.
Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court
Majority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.
Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)
Link to Opinion: Here.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:
• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"
• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"
Primary Cases:
• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive
• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control