Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.
Respondent: Prutehi Guahan.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The U.S. Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of Guam, adjacent to Tarague Beach—a coastal area that sits above Guam's sole-source drinking-water aquifer and serves as habitat for endangered sea turtles. Since 1982, the Air Force has disposed of hazardous waste munitions at Tarague Beach through open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) operations, a method that involves igniting or exploding ordnance in open air. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Air Force must obtain a permit every three years from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA), which has administered RCRA on the island since 1986. The Air Force has renewed that permit on a triennial cycle without interruption.

When its most recent permit approached expiration in September 2021, the Air Force submitted a renewal application to Guam EPA in May 2021—without first preparing any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The application described planned OB/OD operations for 2021 through 2024 and proposed restarting open burning, which had been inactive since at least the early 2000s. The Air Force conducted no environmental impact statement, no environmental assessment, and offered no public comment opportunity before committing to that plan. Guam EPA accepted the application, held a public comment period, and issued a preliminary notice neither approving nor denying the application while it reviewed public comments. Meanwhile, under RCRA's automatic-extension provision, the Air Force continued OB/OD operations under its 2018 permit while the renewal remained pending.

Prutehi Litekyan filed suit in the District Court of Guam in January 2022, alleging that the Air Force violated NEPA by submitting its RCRA permit renewal application without conducting the required environmental review; the district court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss on three grounds—lack of standing, absence of final agency action, and failure to state a claim—and Prutehi Litekyan timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed all three holdings.

Question

1. When the federal government submits a permit application to continue disposing of hazardous waste, does that submission count as a final, reviewable government decision under federal law?

2. Before submitting that permit application, must the federal government first conduct the broad environmental review that federal law generally requires—even though the hazardous waste permitting process already includes its own, more limited environmental review?

Oral argument for Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, argued on October 06, 2026.

Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.
Respondent: County Commissioners of Boulder County.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Boulder County and the City of Boulder (collectively, "Boulder") sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy entities, alleging that the companies' decades-long production, promotion, refining, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels knowingly drove climate change and caused concrete harm to Boulder's property and residents. Boulder further alleges that the defendants compounded this harm by intentionally misleading the public about fossil fuels' role in accelerating climate change. The alleged injuries include flood damage, increased wildfire risk, drought, and physical damage to public buildings and infrastructure—costs Boulder claims it has absorbed and will continue to absorb.

To recover those costs, Boulder asserts state common law claims for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Critically, Boulder seeks only monetary damages—not an injunction against fossil fuel operations or any form of emissions regulation. The defendants argue that these state-law claims are precluded because federal law—specifically the Clean Air Act, the federal common law of interstate pollution, and the federal foreign affairs power—occupies the field and bars state courts from adjudicating harms rooted in interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions.

Boulder filed suit in state court; the defendants removed the case to federal court, but after extensive litigation that included appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and two certiorari petitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the remand order and the case returned to the Boulder County District Court, which denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on preemption grounds. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for extraordinary review under C.A.R. 21, which that court accepted and resolved in Boulder's favor on May 12, 2025.

Question

1. Does the Court have statutory and Article III jurisdiction to hear this case?

2. Does federal law preclude state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate?

Johnson v. United States Congress

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Floyd D. Johnson.
Respondent: United States Congress.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Floyd D. Johnson, a United States Army veteran, began receiving disability benefits for service-related post-traumatic stress disorder while serving a 40-year prison sentence in Florida. Although the Veterans Benefits Administration initially approved a high level of compensation, it later reduced Johnson’s monthly payments to a 10 percent rate. The agency cited a federal law, 38 U.S.C. § 5313, which limits disability compensation for veterans incarcerated for more than 60 days following a felony conviction.

Johnson filed a lawsuit against the United States Congress in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the benefits reduction law. He argued that the statute acted as an unconstitutional “bill of attainder”—a law that unfairly targets specific individuals for punishment—and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson requested a court order to stop the government from reducing benefits for incarcerated veterans and sought retroactive pay for the withheld funds.

The district court dismissed Johnson’s complaint as frivolous after assuming it had jurisdiction to hear his constitutional claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated that judgment and ordered the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act strips district courts of the power to hear such challenges.

Question

Did the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act stripp district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this court in Johnson v. Robison, to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans’ benefits?

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 29, 2026.

Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Advocates: Charles B. Klein (for the Petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Amarin Pharma markets icosapent ethyl under the brand name Vascepa. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication), which affects patients with blood triglyceride levels of at least 500 mg/dL. In 2019, following additional research and clinical trials, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (the CV indication). Amarin listed two patents covering the CV indication in the FDA’s Orange Book.

In 2016, Hikma Pharmaceuticals submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval for a generic version of icosapent ethyl. When the CV indication was approved in 2019, Hikma filed a “section viii statement” seeking FDA approval only for the SH indication by “carving out” the patented CV indication from its label—creating a “skinny label.” The FDA approved Hikma’s ANDA in May 2020. Throughout 2020, Hikma issued press releases referring to its product as the “generic version” or “generic equivalent” of Vascepa, describing Vascepa as indicated “in part” for the SH indication, and citing Vascepa sales figures (over $1 billion annually) that were attributable primarily to the CV indication. Hikma also marketed its product on its website under the therapeutic category “Hypertriglyceridemia” and as “AB” rated, though with a disclaimer that it was approved for fewer indications than Vascepa.

In November 2020, Amarin sued Hikma for induced infringement of its CV indication patents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Amarin’s allegations—based on Hikma’s skinny label combined with its press releases and marketing materials—plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement.

Question

1. When a generic drug manufacturer excludes a patented use from its label, can it still be liable for inducing infringement if it calls its product a “generic version” of the brand-name drug and cites publicly available information about the brand-name drug’s sales?

2. Can a patent infringement complaint survive dismissal if it does not allege that the defendant made any statement specifically instructing or encouraging the patented use?