Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [24-808] Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton

  Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2025. Petitioner: Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc.Respondent: Jeanne Ann Burton. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, a Nashville-based auto-parts corporation, entered bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. In 2015, Vista-Pro—later represented by its Chapter 7 trustee—filed an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, to recover about $50,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro mailed the summons and complaint to Coney Island’s Brooklyn address addressed only to the corporate entity, not to any officer, agent, or individual as required for proper service under the rules governing service on corporations. Coney Island did not respond to the complaint, leading the bankruptcy court in May 2015 to enter a default judgment against it. Following reconversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee repeatedly attempted to collect the judgment. Coney Island received notice of the judgment at least as early as April 2016 when its CEO was sent a demand letter. Years later, after the trustee sought to enforce the judgment by freezing Coney Island’s bank assets in New York, Coney Island sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that it was void due to improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court and later the district court denied Coney Island’s motion to vacate the judgment as untimely. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under its precedents interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), motions to vacate void judgments must be filed within a reasonable time. Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) impose any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?

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• [24-724] Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist

  Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2025. Petitioner: The Hain Celestial Group, Inc., et al.Respondent: Sarah Palmquist, Individually and as Next Friend of E.P., a Minor. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Grant and Sarah Palmquist’s son Ethan developed normally until about 30 months of age, when he experienced sudden and severe developmental regression, including cognitive, behavioral, and physical impairments. He was later diagnosed with a range of conditions—some physical, like seizures and hypotonia, and others mental, like autism and neurocognitive disorders. Tests also revealed high levels of toxic heavy metals in Ethan’s system, which some physicians attributed to heavy-metal poisoning. The Palmquists linked his symptoms to his nearly exclusive consumption of Earth’s Best Organic baby food—manufactured by Hain Celestial Group, Inc. and sold by Whole Foods Market, Inc.—from infancy through toddlerhood. In 2021, a U.S. House Oversight Committee report revealed that Hain’s baby foods contained high levels of arsenic, lead, cadmium, and mercury and that Hain had not tested final products for such contaminants until 2019. In 2021, the Palmquists sued Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, raising various state-law claims. Hain removed the case to federal court, alleging that Whole Foods had been improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand. It later granted judgment as a matter of law for Hain during trial. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Palmquists had adequately stated claims against Whole Foods, defeating diversity jurisdiction. It vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to state court. Question Must a federal court’s final judgment be set aside if the case did not have complete diversity when it was removed from state court, and can a plaintiff block diversity jurisdiction by updating the complaint after removal to include a valid claim against a nondiverse defendant?

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• [24-924] Hencely v. Fluor Corp.

  Hencely v. Fluor Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2025. Petitioner: Winston Tyler Hencely.Respondent: Fluor Corporation. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2016, U.S. Army Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely was stationed at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Fluor Corporation held a Department of Defense contract to provide base life support services at Bagram, including vehicle maintenance and hazardous materials management. Under the military’s “Afghan First” counterinsurgency program, which aimed to develop the Afghan economy by employing local nationals, Fluor’s subcontractor hired Ahmad Nayeb, an Afghan national. The Army sponsored Nayeb’s employment despite knowing he was a former Taliban member, viewing his hiring as a reintegration effort. Nayeb worked the night shift at the hazardous materials section of the non-tactical vehicle yard with limited supervision. During his employment, Nayeb likely smuggled explosives onto the base and constructed an explosive vest while working alone, using base tools including a multimeter he had checked out despite not needing it for his assigned duties. On the morning of November 12, 2016, at the end of his shift, Nayeb was supposed to board a bus to be escorted off base. Instead, he lied about needing to attend a hazardous materials class and walked undetected for 53 minutes to an area near the starting line of a Veterans Day 5K race. When Hencely and others confronted him, Nayeb detonated his vest, killing himself and five others while severely wounding seventeen more, including Hencely. The Taliban claimed credit for the attack. Hencely sued Fluor in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging negligent supervision, entrustment, and retention under South Carolina law, as well as breach of the government contract. The district court granted judgment to Fluor on all claims, holding that federal law preempted the state tort claims and that Hencely was not a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the government contract. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, which immunized government contractors from liability under certain circumstances, extend to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

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• [24-1056] Rico v. United States

  Rico v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2025. Petitioner: Isabel Rico.Respondent: United States of America. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In May 2018, Isabel Rico absconded from supervised release after serving only five months of her 42-month term. Rico had originally been convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and was serving supervised release as part of her sentence. She remained a fugitive until January 2023, when authorities located her. In February 2023, the probation office filed violations based on her absconding and other conduct during her supervised release term. The district court revoked Rico’s supervised release and sentenced her to 16 months in prison followed by a new two-year term of supervised release. Rico appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court lacked authority to revoke her supervised release because her original 42-month term would have expired during the time she was a fugitive, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. Question Does the fugitive-tolling doctrine apply in the context of supervised release?

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• [24-109] Reargument: Louisiana v. Callais

  Louisiana v. Callais (Reargument) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2025. Appellant: Louisiana.Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections.   Question Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?  

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