Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Angelo Brock.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law.

Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Question

Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

Noem v. Al Otro Lado

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks.

While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials.

Question

Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.
Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability.

Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case.

BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions.

Question

May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?

Watson v. Republican National Committee

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.
Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states.

In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day.

Question

Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 4, 2026.

Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.
Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC.

Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents)

Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance.

Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier.

The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim.

Question

Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?