Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Beaird v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 13, 2026.

Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.
Respondent: United States of America.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During sentencing, the district court applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” While the text of the Guidelines does not define that term, the accompanying official Commentary specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds triggers the increased penalty.

Beaird possessed a magazine that held 17 rounds. He argued that the district court erred by relying on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines. This challenge focuses on the level of deference courts must grant to supplemental Commentary, especially when that Commentary expands the scope of sentencing enhancements beyond the written text of the Guidelines.

The district court sentenced Beaird to 72 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that prior circuit precedent foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the court’s reliance on the Guidelines commentary.

Question

Does Stinson v. United States still correctly state the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2026.

Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.
Respondent: Prutehi Guahan.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The U.S. Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of Guam, adjacent to Tarague Beach—a coastal area that sits above Guam's sole-source drinking-water aquifer and serves as habitat for endangered sea turtles. Since 1982, the Air Force has disposed of hazardous waste munitions at Tarague Beach through open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) operations, a method that involves igniting or exploding ordnance in open air. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Air Force must obtain a permit every three years from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA), which has administered RCRA on the island since 1986. The Air Force has renewed that permit on a triennial cycle without interruption.

When its most recent permit approached expiration in September 2021, the Air Force submitted a renewal application to Guam EPA in May 2021—without first preparing any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The application described planned OB/OD operations for 2021 through 2024 and proposed restarting open burning, which had been inactive since at least the early 2000s. The Air Force conducted no environmental impact statement, no environmental assessment, and offered no public comment opportunity before committing to that plan. Guam EPA accepted the application, held a public comment period, and issued a preliminary notice neither approving nor denying the application while it reviewed public comments. Meanwhile, under RCRA's automatic-extension provision, the Air Force continued OB/OD operations under its 2018 permit while the renewal remained pending.

Prutehi Litekyan filed suit in the District Court of Guam in January 2022, alleging that the Air Force violated NEPA by submitting its RCRA permit renewal application without conducting the required environmental review; the district court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss on three grounds—lack of standing, absence of final agency action, and failure to state a claim—and Prutehi Litekyan timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed all three holdings.

Question

1. When the federal government submits a permit application to continue disposing of hazardous waste, does that submission count as a final, reviewable government decision under federal law?

2. Before submitting that permit application, must the federal government first conduct the broad environmental review that federal law generally requires—even though the hazardous waste permitting process already includes its own, more limited environmental review?

Oral argument for Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, argued on October 06, 2026.

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 5, 2026.

Petitioner: Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.
Respondent: County Commissioners of Boulder County.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Boulder County and the City of Boulder (collectively, "Boulder") sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy entities, alleging that the companies' decades-long production, promotion, refining, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels knowingly drove climate change and caused concrete harm to Boulder's property and residents. Boulder further alleges that the defendants compounded this harm by intentionally misleading the public about fossil fuels' role in accelerating climate change. The alleged injuries include flood damage, increased wildfire risk, drought, and physical damage to public buildings and infrastructure—costs Boulder claims it has absorbed and will continue to absorb.

To recover those costs, Boulder asserts state common law claims for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Critically, Boulder seeks only monetary damages—not an injunction against fossil fuel operations or any form of emissions regulation. The defendants argue that these state-law claims are precluded because federal law—specifically the Clean Air Act, the federal common law of interstate pollution, and the federal foreign affairs power—occupies the field and bars state courts from adjudicating harms rooted in interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions.

Boulder filed suit in state court; the defendants removed the case to federal court, but after extensive litigation that included appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and two certiorari petitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the remand order and the case returned to the Boulder County District Court, which denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on preemption grounds. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for extraordinary review under C.A.R. 21, which that court accepted and resolved in Boulder's favor on May 12, 2025.

Question

1. Does the Court have statutory and Article III jurisdiction to hear this case?

2. Does federal law preclude state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate?

Johnson v. United States Congress

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 5, 2026.

Petitioner: Floyd D. Johnson.
Respondent: United States Congress.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Floyd D. Johnson, a United States Army veteran, began receiving disability benefits for service-related post-traumatic stress disorder while serving a 40-year prison sentence in Florida. Although the Veterans Benefits Administration initially approved a high level of compensation, it later reduced Johnson’s monthly payments to a 10 percent rate. The agency cited a federal law, 38 U.S.C. § 5313, which limits disability compensation for veterans incarcerated for more than 60 days following a felony conviction.

Johnson filed a lawsuit against the United States Congress in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the benefits reduction law. He argued that the statute acted as an unconstitutional “bill of attainder”—a law that unfairly targets specific individuals for punishment—and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson requested a court order to stop the government from reducing benefits for incarcerated veterans and sought retroactive pay for the withheld funds.

The district court dismissed Johnson’s complaint as frivolous after assuming it had jurisdiction to hear his constitutional claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated that judgment and ordered the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act strips district courts of the power to hear such challenges.

Question

Did the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act stripp district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this court in Johnson v. Robison, to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans’ benefits?