Supreme Court Oral Arguments

St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Nov 3, 2026.

Petitioner: St. Mary Catholic Parish, Littleton, Colorado.
Respondent: Lisa Roy, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Colorado voters established the Universal Preschool Program (UPK) to provide free preschool services through a “mixed delivery system” of public and private providers. To receive state funds, providers must sign a nondiscrimination agreement that requires them to enroll students regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Two Catholic parishes and the Archdiocese of Denver sought to participate in the program but refused to sign the agreement. They argued that their religious tenets require them to consider the sexual orientation and gender identity of families during admissions to maintain their religious environment.

The schools specifically challenged the program’s “preference system,” which uses an algorithm to match families with schools based on categories like sibling enrollment or congregation membership. They also highlighted a “temporary waiver” provision that allows the state to grant providers extra time to meet certain quality standards. The schools argued that these features create a system of “individualized exemptions” where the state exercises discretion to favor secular interests. Because the state allows these secular preferences while denying a religious exemption to the nondiscrimination rule, the schools contended the program unconstitutionally penalizes them for their religious character.

The district court denied the schools’ request for a permanent injunction, ruling that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral and generally applicable law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision, holding that the state’s program does not grant the type of unfettered discretion that would trigger strict scrutiny.

Question

Does a law lack general applicability under the Free Exercise Clause only if it permits unfettered discretion or secular exemptions, and does the rule against excluding religious institutions from public benefits apply only to explicit government bans on participation?

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2026.

Petitioner: Jasmine Younge.
Respondent: Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia .


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In April 2019, Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard — an elected official — hired Dr. Jasmine Younge as Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs at a salary of $120,282. Younge ranked third in the office's chain of command, reported exclusively to Howard, supervised more than thirty employees, and worked so closely with Howard that he described her as a "key member" and his "go-to person for almost everything." About two months into her tenure, Younge told Howard she was pregnant.

After that announcement, Howard stopped meeting with Younge, excluded her from meetings, treated her dismissively, and reassigned some of her duties — then fired her two weeks later. Younge sued the Fulton County District Attorney's Office for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. In its answer, the DA's Office raised several affirmative defenses but did not plead the Title VII personal-staff exemption — which excludes from Title VII's coverage persons chosen to serve on an elected official's "personal staff." The DA's Office did not recognize the exemption as relevant until it began preparing its summary judgment motion, after discovery had already closed.

The district court allowed the DA's Office to raise the personal-staff exemption for the first time at summary judgment, finding no prejudice to Younge from the late assertion, and granted summary judgment to the DA's Office on that basis; Younge then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed.

Question

May a defendant raise an affirmative defense it never pleaded in its answer as the sole basis for a summary judgment motion — without seeking to amend its answer — and does it matter that the court's scheduling order deadline would have barred any such amendment?

Maxwell v. Dinis

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Nov 2, 2026.

Petitioner: William Maxwell.
Respondent: Sandra Dinis, Acting Warden.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

William Maxwell is a federal prisoner housed at FCI Beaumont Low in Texas. In 2020, Maxwell asked prison officials to transfer him to a halfway house or home confinement, invoking several laws including the First Step Act's earned time credit provisions, which require the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to apply credits prisoners earn through participation in rehabilitation programs toward earlier placement in prerelease custody. The BOP responded only to Maxwell's request under the separate CARES Act and denied it, ignoring his First Step Act arguments entirely. After Maxwell pushed through the BOP's administrative grievance process — a process he contends the BOP actively obstructed by losing filings, failing to respond, and submitting a false declaration claiming he never raised First Step Act claims — he filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking transfer to a halfway house or home confinement based on his earned First Step Act time credits.

The district court dismissed Maxwell's petition, ruling he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his First Step Act claims. Maxwell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which sua sponte affirmed dismissal on a different ground — holding under its own bright-line rule that because a favorable ruling would not automatically accelerate Maxwell's release from prison, a civil rights lawsuit, not a habeas petition, was the only proper vehicle for his claims.

Question

Can a federal prisoner use a habeas corpus petition to challenge the government's calculation of First Step Act time credits in order to seek an earlier transfer to a halfway house or home confinement?

Oral argument for Salazar v. Paramount Global, argued on October 14, 2026.
YouTube

Beaird v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube

Argued on Oct 13, 2026.

Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates: Kevin Joel Page (for the Petitioner)

Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur)

Anthony J. Dick (Court-appointed amicus curiae)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During sentencing, the district court applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” While the text of the Guidelines does not define that term, the accompanying official Commentary specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds triggers the increased penalty.

Beaird possessed a magazine that held 17 rounds. He argued that the district court erred by relying on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines. This challenge focuses on the level of deference courts must grant to supplemental Commentary, especially when that Commentary expands the scope of sentencing enhancements beyond the written text of the Guidelines.

The district court sentenced Beaird to 72 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that prior circuit precedent foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the court’s reliance on the Guidelines commentary.

Question

Does Stinson v. United States still correctly state the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?