Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Watson v. Republican National Committee

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.
Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states.

In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day.

Question

Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 4, 2026.

Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.
Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC.

Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents)

Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance.

Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier.

The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim.

Question

Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?

Hunter v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 3, 2026.

Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)

Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician.

Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty.

Question

1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum? 

2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?

United States v. Hemani

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 2, 2026.

Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani.

Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)

Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine.

The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession.

Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional.

Question

Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?

Pung v. Isabella County

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Feb 25, 2026.

Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.
Respondent: sabella County, Michigan.

Advocates: Philip L. Ellison (for the Petitioner)

Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)

Matthew T. Nelson (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case involves a dispute over the foreclosure and sale of the Pung property in Isabella County, Michigan, following the death of its owner, Timothy Scott Pung, in 2004. The property had a Principal Residence Exemption (PRE) from local school taxes. In 2010, the township tax assessor, Patricia DePriest, retroactively denied the PRE for the years 2007-2009, asserting a new owner must file an affidavit. Although the Michigan Tax Tribunal overturned this decision in 2012, holding the PRE remained valid for the estate, DePriest subsequently revoked the PRE for the 2012 tax year based on the same unfiled-affidavit rationale. This denial created an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. The County Treasurer, Steven Pickens, initiated foreclosure proceedings for this delinquency. After a final judgment of foreclosure, the property sold at a public auction for $76,008. Isabella County and Pickens retained the entire $76,008 from the sale, refusing to return the surplus proceeds above the tax debt to Michael Pung, the estate's representative. Michael Pung sued, alleging this retention of the surplus violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

The district court granted Pung summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim, ruling he was entitled to the surplus proceeds (the sale price minus the tax debt), but not to the greater loss in equity based on the property’s fair market value. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims, including the amount of compensation awarded.

 

Question

1. When the government takes property for tax debt, does the Fifth Amendment require compensation based on the property’s true fair market value, or only on the lower amount it sold for at a tax foreclosure auction?

2. Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibit the government from seizing and keeping a property worth far more than the small tax debt owed on it?