Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Pitchford v. Cain

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Terry Pitchford.
Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 2004 armed robbery and killing of Reuben Britt, a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi. At the time of the crime, Pitchford was 18 years old. He confessed to participating in the robbery, although the fatal shot was fired by his accomplice. At Pitchford’s 2006 trial in the Grenada County Circuit Court, the jury was selected from a pool that included 36 white and five Black potential jurors. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors. Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection, alleging that the strikes were racially discriminatory.

The trial court found Pitchford had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each strike. The prosecutor cited explanations such as the venirepersons’ criminal histories, perceived mental health issues, or similarities to the defendant. The trial judge accepted those explanations and allowed the strikes, ultimately empaneling a jury that included only one Black juror. Pitchford’s counsel sought to preserve Batson-related objections during a bench conference, emphasizing the racial composition of the jury and the county, but did not conduct a further comparative analysis or expressly argue that the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Pitchford’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which held that any pretext arguments had been waived for failure to raise them clearly at trial. A federal district court later granted habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling the Mississippi Supreme Court had reasonably applied Batson and its waiver rule. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined, under AEDPA, that Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications for the challenged juror strikes.

Question

Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably decide—under the standards set by federal habeas law—that Terry Pitchford gave up his right to argue that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking four Black jurors were false or racially biased?

Abouammo v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Ahmad Abouammo.
Respondent: United States of America.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2013, Twitter hired Ahmad Abouammo, a U.S. citizen, as a Media Partnerships Manager responsible for high-profile users in the Middle East and North Africa. Through this role, he became involved with Bader Binasaker, a close aide to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Beginning in 2014, Abouammo used his access to Twitter’s proprietary tools to gather nonpublic information—including email addresses, phone numbers, and IP data—about Saudi dissident Twitter users, particularly accounts critical of the Saudi royal family. He transmitted this information to Binasaker—circumstantially inferred through encrypted messaging services—and was rewarded with lavish gifts, including a luxury Hublot watch, and over $300,000 in wire transfers to a Lebanese bank account held in his father’s name. Communication between the two included expressions of intent to “delete evil,” suggesting the sensitive nature of their collaboration.

After leaving Twitter in 2015, Abouammo continued to facilitate communication between Saudi representatives and Twitter, allegedly under the guise of social media consulting. In October 2018, FBI agents approached him as part of an investigation into unauthorized access of Twitter accounts connected to Saudi espionage. During the interview at his Seattle home, Abouammo denied wrongdoing and claimed he was paid for legitimate consulting. While the agents waited in his home, Abouammo fabricated an invoice to substantiate this claim and emailed it to them. The actions connected to the allegedly falsified document—including the questioning, fabrication, and transmission—all took place in Seattle. The agents who received the document, though physically present in Seattle at the time, worked out of the FBI field office in San Francisco.

A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California indicted Abouammo for falsifying a record with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, among other charges. Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count for improper venue, arguing that all relevant conduct occurred in Seattle. The district court denied the motion, holding venue proper in the Northern District because the statute required an intent to obstruct an investigation based there. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that venue is proper in a district where the obstructed investigation occurred, even if none of the defendant’s physical conduct took place there.

Question

Is venue proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there?

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Adrian Jules.
Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles until he was fired in March 2020. In December 2020, he sued multiple individuals and affiliated corporate entities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging discrimination and other claims under both federal and state law. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jules signed with Chateau Marmont, which was not initially named as a party. The district court stayed the litigation pending arbitration but did not formally compel arbitration, as the agreement required arbitration to occur in California, outside that court’s district.

Jules proceeded to arbitrate his claims against Chateau alone. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against him on all claims and sanctioned him and his attorney for misconduct during the arbitration. After the award, Jules returned to the district court, seeking to vacate it, while Chateau and other defendants sought to confirm it—even though some of them were not parties to the arbitration proceeding. Jules argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the award because the post-arbitration petitions, on their face, did not establish federal jurisdiction.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that because the court had jurisdiction over the original, stayed lawsuit, it retained jurisdiction over subsequent applications to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. That ruling deepened a split among the courts of appeals, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari.

Question

Does a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintain jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking?

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 25, 2026.

Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Angelo Brock.

Advocates: Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners)

Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law.

Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Question

Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

Noem v. Al Otro Lado

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Mar 24, 2026.

Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation.

Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners)

Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks.

While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials.

Question

Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?