Oral Arguments, with Context

The Fifth Circuit considers a fight over a two-hundred-fifty-million-dollar financing deal for Wesco Aircraft Holdings. In 2022, the company needed cash, and a group of its bondholders supplied new money in exchange for a better position in its debt structure. Other bondholders were excluded from that deal, and the collateral backing their existing bonds was released. The dispute concerns the so-called 2026 notes and their indenture, the contract governing those bonds. Releasing their collateral required consent from two-thirds of the outstanding debt, but the participating group initially held less than that. The group first approved changes allowing new bonds, bought them for two hundred fifty million dollars, and counted those new bonds toward the later vote to release the collateral. The excluded investors say that sequence defeated the protection they had bargained for. Wesco entered bankruptcy in 2023. A bankruptcy judge recommended treating the original bondholders' liens as still in effect; those liens are the claims against company assets securing repayment. The district court rejected that recommendation, found no contract breach, and concluded that even a breach would call for money damages against Wesco rather than restoring those liens. The excluded bondholders now seek to revive that protection. Their counsel will argue that the steps were one integrated deal that required the higher vote from the start. The participating bondholders' counsel will defend the steps as separate transactions, each authorized when it occurred. Listen for the contrast between a right to share in specific collateral and an unsecured damages claim against a bankrupt company.

Wesco v. 2026 Noteholders (No. 26-20018) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/26/26-20018_11-02-2026.mp3

Case and argument date — official Fifth Circuit recording archive:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/results?from=2026-08-01&to=2026-11-05&page=2

Financing transaction, contract terms and prior ruling — S.D. Tex. ECF 119, December 8, 2025; official GovInfo copy of district-court memorandum order, not this appeal's outcome:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-txsd-4_25-cv-00202/pdf/USCOURTS-txsd-4_25-cv-00202-0.pdf

The D.C. Circuit considers a dispute over lawmakers' access to immigration detention facilities. In June 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement adopted a policy requiring members of Congress to give seven days' notice before visiting detention facilities. Lawmakers wanted to inspect conditions and gather information for their oversight work, but several were turned away for failing to give advance notice. They sued, pointing to Section Five Twenty-Seven, a spending restriction that bars the use of covered funds to prevent congressional oversight visits and says members need not provide prior notice. A district court suspended the policy. In January 2026, the Department of Homeland Security reinstated the notice requirement, saying it would use funding not subject to that restriction. The district court again blocked the policy, and the government appealed. Much of this argument concerns standing: whether these lawmakers have the kind of injury that allows them to bring this lawsuit in federal court. The government will argue that oversight belongs to Congress as an institution, so individual members cannot bring this suit over interference with that power. The lawmakers' counsel will argue that each member denied access suffers a personal loss of information the statute entitles that member to obtain. The judges will probe that distinction, as well as whether the policy was implemented using funds covered by the restriction.

Joe Neguse v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (No. 26-5072) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued November 3, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/11/26-5072.mp3

Case and argument date — official D.C. Circuit November 2026 archive:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/11

Case background and claimed access injuries — D.D.C. ECF 53, January 26, 2026; filed complaint, allegations not findings; public copy hosted by Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse:
https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/168148.pdf

Prior proceedings and competing standing analysis — official D.C. Circuit May 8, 2026 stay order and Judge Rao's concurrence; not a final merits decision:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/05/26-5072LDSN.pdf

The First Circuit hears a Haitian man's challenge to being sent to Mexico. An immigration judge had already granted him withholding of removal to Haiti, protecting him from deportation to that country. But in July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security told him it intended to remove him to Mexico instead. He says he was kidnapped and threatened with death in Mexico while traveling to the United States. He asked to reopen his immigration case and sought review in the First Circuit. Withholding is country-specific: protection against return to Haiti does not automatically prevent removal somewhere else. A motion to reopen asks the immigration agency to reconsider a completed case in light of new facts. You will hear ultra vires, meaning action beyond an official's lawful authority. Statutory withholding requires a connection between threatened persecution and a protected ground, such as race or nationality. Protection under the Convention Against Torture has a different focus: whether torture is more likely than not.

Ralph Bronson Fils-Aime v. Todd Blanche (No. 25-1733) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording. The original cuts off during the judge's final administrative closing remark after all advocacy has ended; the gap is preserved and no speech reconstructed:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1733_20261103.mp3

Argument date — official First Circuit recording listing:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

Consolidated case/date — official First Circuit November calendar:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/calendar.pdf?TB_iframe=true

Case background — filed D.N.H. habeas petition, August 3, 2025; public mirrored copy, allegations not findings:
https://habeasdockets.org/media/documents/71006849/001_11703306062-48d4a290fdfe.pdf

Country-specific statutory withholding — 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1231

Reopening proceedings — 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1229a

Withholding, torture protection and third-country removal — 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/1208.16

Legal vocabulary — Cornell Wex definition of ultra vires:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ultra_vires

The Eleventh Circuit hears Solomon versus Isaac Btesh. The brothers are disputing their interests in a family bank in Panama and the proceeds of its sale. A family agreement referred disputes to procedures used by a Jewish congregation there. Solomon began arbitration in Panama, then pursued proceedings in Miami. A Miami rabbinical panel issued an award against Isaac, who did not participate in that arbitration. Solomon asked a Florida federal court to confirm the award, meaning turn it into an enforceable court judgment. The judge dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction: the court's power over Isaac. That differs from the arbitrators' authority under the family agreement. One route discussed here is Rule 4(k)(2), a federal rule for federal claims when no state's courts can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. It looks beyond a single state, but exercising jurisdiction must still be constitutional. Another route, quasi in rem jurisdiction, concerns specified property, with recovery limited to that property rather than a general personal judgment. The judges also discuss dicta: observations in an earlier opinion that were not necessary to decide that case. Listen for the distinction between agreeing to arbitrate, choosing a particular tribunal, and giving an American court authority to enforce an award.

Solomon Btesh v. Isaac Btesh (No. 25-11265) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, argued November 3, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Eleventh Circuit recording:
https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_argument_recordings/25-11265_11032026.mp3

Argument date — official Eleventh Circuit recordings listing:
https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?page=0

Argument calendar — official Eleventh Circuit panel release:
https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_arguments/cal2%28Rev.2panelrelease%29.pdf

Case background and prior dismissal — district-court order, public copy hosted by A&O Shearman:
https://us-arbitration.aoshearman.com/siteFiles/50610/2025.03.21%20Btesh%20v.%20Btesh%2C%20No.%2023-CV-23679-JB%20%28S.D.%20Fla.%20Mar.%2021%2C%202025%29.pdf

Federal jurisdictional route — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_4

Confirmation provision discussed — 9 U.S.C. § 9:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/9/9

Property-based jurisdiction — Supreme Court opinion in Shaffer:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/433/186

Legal vocabulary — Cornell Wex definition of dicta:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dicta

The First Circuit hears United States versus Jorge Mercado. After serving time for an armed robbery, Mercado was on supervised release, a period of court-ordered supervision after prison. During that supervision, he possessed a machine gun and ammunition. That conduct led to a new criminal sentence and a separate prison term for violating his release conditions. In an earlier appeal, the First Circuit left the machine-gun sentence in place but vacated the revocation sentence because the judge had not adequately explained why it exceeded the advisory sentencing range. This appeal returns to those limits on revocation sentencing. An upward variance means a sentence above that advisory range, not necessarily above the statutory maximum. Another distinction runs through the argument: retribution means punishment because past wrongdoing deserves it; deterrence aims to prevent future crime. The Supreme Court has held that judges may not rely on retribution for the original offense when revoking supervised release. That ruling left open whether retribution for violating supervision is permissible. Listen for how the judges distinguish punishment for past conduct from deterrence and protecting the public, and what explanation an above-guidelines sentence requires.

United States v. Mercado-Cañizares (No. 25-1867) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1867_20261103.mp3

Argument date — official First Circuit recordings listing:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

Argument calendar — official First Circuit calendar:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/calendar.pdf?TB_iframe=true

Case background and earlier remand — First Circuit opinion, April 2, 2025:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/21-1903P-01A.pdf

Revocation and retribution — Supreme Court opinion in Esteras:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-7483_6k4c.pdf

Supervised release — 18 U.S.C. § 3583:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partII-chap227-subchapD-sec3583.htm

Sentencing factors — 18 U.S.C. § 3553:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partII-chap227-subchapA-sec3553.htm